Protection, lobbying, and market structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hillman, AL; Van Long, N; Soubeyran, A
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; McGill University; McGill University; Bar Ilan University; Aix-Marseille Universite
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00085-X
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 383-409
• 关键词: Lobbying; oligopolistic industry; internal cost-reducing activities

摘要

We look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost-reducing activities. We ask the following questions: (i) if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying. what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost-reducing activities? (ii) Can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms? (iii) tinder what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid? The answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.