Does one Bayesian make a difference?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mueller-Frank, Manuel
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 423-452
• 关键词: Social networks; information aggregation; Bayesian learning; Boundedly rational learning; social learning; consensus

摘要

This paper develops a model of repeated interaction in social networks among agents with differing degrees of sophistication. The focus of the model is observational learning; that is, each agent receives initial private information and makes inferences regarding the private information of others through the repeated interaction with his neighbors in the network. The main question is how well agents aggregate private information through their local interactions. I show that in finite networks consisting exclusively of non-Bayesian (boundedly rational) agents, who revise their choices by averaging over the previous period's observed choices, all agents fail to perfectly aggregate the privately held information. However, the presence of at least one Bayesian agent in a strongly connected network is shown to be generically sufficient for every agent, whether Bayesian or non-Bayesian, to perfectly aggregate the private information of all agents. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.