Limited commitment and the legal restrictions theory of the demand for money

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ferraris, Leo; Mattesini, Fabrizio
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Rome Tor Vergata
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.008
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 196-215
• 关键词: money; Government Bonds; Rate of return dominance; Legal restrictions

摘要

This paper addresses the rate of return puzzle of monetary theory. Similarly to the legal restrictions theory of the demand for money, we assume that Government bonds are subject to a minimum purchase requirement. Differently from this theory, however, we assume that intermediaries, when issuing private notes, cannot commit to always redeem them. First, we study an environment with legal restrictions to intermediation and show that cash and interest bearing bonds both circulate in the economy. Then, we drop the legal restrictions and show that also with active intermediation, under limited commitment, there is an equilibrium with rate of return dominance. A positive interest rate provides the intermediaries with the incentive to issue and redeem their notes. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.