Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.007
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 191-212
• 关键词: communication; Informational size; private monitoring; Public monitoring; repeated games; Robustness

摘要

A repeated game with private monitoring is close to a repeated game with public monitoring (or perfect monitoring) when (i) the expected payoff structures are close and (ii) the informational structures are close in the sense that private signals in the private monitoring game can be aggregated by some public coordination device to generate a public signal whose distribution is close to the distribution of the public signal in the public monitoring game. We provide a sufficient condition for the set of uniformly strict perfect public equilibria for a public monitoring game to be robust in nearby private monitoring games in the sense that they remain equilibria with respect to the public signal that is generated by such public coordination devices with truthful reporting. Our sufficient condition requires that every player is informationally small in a well-defined sense. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.