Coordination, cooperation, contagion and currency crises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Loisel, O; Martin, P
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(00)00055-6
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 399-419
• 关键词: contagion; COORDINATION; COOPERATION; Fixed exchange rates; exchange rate crisis; trade competition

摘要

We present a micro-founded model where governments have an incentive to devalue to increase the national market share in a monopolistically competitive sector. Currency crises generated by self-fulfilling expectations are possible because workers demand high wages when they expect a devaluation. This decreases the competitiveness and profits of national firms and induces the government to devalue. We show that the more important trade competition, the more likely self-fulfilling speculative crises and the larger the set of multiple equilibria. Coordination decreases the possibility of simultaneous self-fulfilling speculative crises in the region and reduces the set of multiple equilibria. However, regional coordination even though welfare improving, makes countries more dependent on other countries' fundamentals so that it may induce more contagion. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.