The equilibrium ownership of an international oligopoly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Horn, H; Persson, L
• 署名单位: Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(00)00059-3
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 307-333
• 关键词: international mergers; Endogenous market structure; tariff jumping FDI

摘要

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is the dominant form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), but has only received scarce attention in the theory literature on trade and investment. This paper highlights how the international pattern of ownership of productive assets may depend on features of trade and production costs. It suggests how high trade costs may be conducive to national ownership of assets, while international firms may arise at lower trade costs, contrary to what the 'tariff jumping' argument would suggest. It is also shown how private and social incentives for M&A may differ for weak merger synergies, but converge when synergies are stronger. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.