Standardization policy and international trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gandal, N; Shy, O
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(00)00067-2
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 363-383
• 关键词: International trade; standardization policy; Trade policy; network effects

摘要

We analyze governments' incentives to recognize foreign standards when there are potentially both network effects and conversion costs. When government policy is limited to either recognizing all foreign standards or not recognizing any foreign standard, recognition is always the outcome. We then consider a setting in which countries can form standardization unions. When conversion costs are relatively large, two countries can increase their welfare by forming a standardization union that does not recognize the standard of the third (nonmember) country. When network effects are significant, all countries mutually recognize all standards and have no incentives to form standardization unions. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.