Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hu, Ju
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.008
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 64-73
• 关键词: Reputation; repeated games; learning; relative entropy

摘要

This note extends Wiseman [6] to more general reputation games with exogenous learning. Using Gossner's [4] relative entropy method, we provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the long-lived player. The lower bound shows that when the exogenous signals are sufficiently noisy and the long-lived player is patient, he can be assured of a payoff strictly higher than his minmax payoff. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.