Symmetric play in repeated allocation games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuzmics, Christoph; Palfrey, Thomas; Rogers, Brian W.
• 署名单位: University of Bielefeld; California Institute of Technology; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.08.002
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 25-67
• 关键词: symmetry; repeated games; Focal points; experiments

摘要

We study symmetric play in a class of repeated games when players are patient. We show that, while the use of symmetric strategy profiles essentially does not restrict the set of feasible payoffs, the set of equilibrium payoffs is an interesting proper subset of the feasible and individually rational set. We also provide a theory of how rational individuals play these games, identifying particular strategies as focal through the considerations of Pareto optimality and simplicity. We report experiments that support many aspects of this theory. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.