Improving Nash by coarse correlation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moulin, Herve; Ray, Indrajit; Sen Gupta, Sonali
• 署名单位: Rice University; University of Birmingham; Lancaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.008
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 852-865
• 关键词: Coarse correlated equilibrium; Quadratic games; Duopoly models; public good

摘要

We consider a class of symmetric two-person quadratic games where coarse correlated equilibria CCE - (Moulin and Vial [16]) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann [3,4]) cannot, because these games are potential games with concave potential functions. We compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE in those games and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two pure strategy profiles. Applications include the Cournot duopoly and the game of public good provision, where the improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff can be substantial. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.