Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; Ryukoku University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.014
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 165-185
• 关键词: Envy-freeness; Indivisible good; manipulation; Nash implementation

摘要

We consider the problem of the fair allocation of indivisible goods and money with non-quasi-linear preferences. The purpose of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy-free solutions. We show that under a certain domain-richness condition, each individual obtains the welfare level of his optimal envy-free allocation by maximally manipulating the solutions. This maximal manipulation theorem is helpful in analyzing the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in the direct revelation games associated with a given envy-free solution: if an envy-free solution satisfies a mild condition, the set of Nash equilibrium allocations in its associated direct revelation game coincides with that of envy-free allocations. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.