Spillovers and international competition for investments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olsen, TE; Osmundsen, P
• 署名单位: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Equinor; Universitetet i Stavanger
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00086-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 211-238
• 关键词: Tax competition; spillovers; externalities; mobility; common agency

摘要

Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm has private information about its efficiency and about spillovers. It is shown that the firm may be harmed by tax competition. Relative to a cooperative tax agreement, tax competition may induce excessive investments in the country where the positive spillover effects are lowest. Also, with sufficiently asymmetric spillovers, investments under competition will be excessively spread out, not properly concentrated to the country where spillovers would be largest. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.