Efficient assignment with interdependent values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo; Kojima, Fuhito
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Seoul National University (SNU); Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.008
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 54-86
• 关键词: House allocation problem; Efficient assignment; interdependent values; Ex-post implementation; Approximate ex-post implementation; Bayesian implementation

摘要

We study the house allocation problem in which n agents are assigned n objects, one for each agent, when the agents have interdependent values. We show that there exists no mechanism that is Pareto efficient and ex-post incentive compatible, and the only mechanism that is ex-post group incentive compatible is constant across states. By contrast, we demonstrate that a Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism exists in the two agent house-allocation problem, given sufficient congruence of preferences and the standard single crossing property. We also show that (approximate) Pareto efficiency can be achieved once we relax the incentive compatibility requirements to approximate ex-post incentive compatibility or Bayesian incentive compatibility. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.