On the persistence of strategic sophistication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Georganas, Sotiris; Healy, Paul J.; Weber, Roberto A.
• 署名单位: City St Georges, University of London; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.012
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 369-400
• 关键词: Level-k; Cognitive hierarchy; Behavioral game theory

摘要

We examine whether the Level-k model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions at the individual level. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of games does not predict their ranking in the other. Direct tests of strategic reasoning generally do not predict estimated levels. Within families of games, we find that levels are fairly consistent within one family, but not the other. Our results suggest that the use of Level-k reasoning varies by game, making prediction difficult. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.