Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Edinburgh; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1-15
• 关键词: Search frictions; Matching function; Meeting technology; competing mechanisms

摘要

In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call invariance, and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition. Published by Elsevier Inc.