Bond restructuring and moral hazard: are collective action clauses costly?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Becker, T; Richards, A; Thaicharoen, Y
• 署名单位: Reserve Bank of Australia; International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00075-2
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 127-161
• 关键词: bond restructuring; Collective Action Clauses; Emerging markets; bond yields; moral hazard; international financial architecture

摘要

Recent emerging market crises have prompted debate over the costs and benefits of collective action clauses (CACs) in bond contracts. CACs may facilitate the restructuring of repayment terms in the event of financial distress. Proponents of CACs argue they should lower borrowing costs, while opponents contend that they lead to moral hazard and increased borrowing costs. This paper examines the pricing of bonds with and without CACs using data for both primary and secondary market yields and finds no evidence that the presence of CACs has increased yields for either higher- or lower-rated issuers. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.