Characterizing social value of information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ui, Takashi; Yoshizawa, Yasunori
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University; Yokohama National University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.007
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 507-535
• 关键词: Bayesian game; incomplete information; Optimal information structure; potential game; Private signal; Public signal; team; value of information

摘要

This paper characterizes the social value of information in Bayesian games with symmetric quadratic payoff functions and normally distributed public and private signals. The main result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare to increase with public or private information. In so doing, we represent welfare as a linear combination of the variance of a common term in an equilibrium strategy and that of an idiosyncratic term, which are referred to as the common variance and the idiosyncratic variance of actions, respectively. The ratio of their coefficients is a key parameter in our condition. If the coefficient of the common variance is relatively large, welfare necessarily increases, but if it is relatively small, welfare can decrease. Using our condition, we find eight types of games with different welfare effects of information. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.