Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fuchs, William; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 371-406
• 关键词: Adverse selection; Market freeze; optimal policy; DYNAMICS; liquidity

摘要

We study government interventions in a dynamic market with asymmetric information. We show that restricting trading opportunities after an initial round of trade is always optimal. Under a sufficient condition it is optimal to subsidize trades only at time zero while imposing prohibitively high taxes afterwards. If interventions are required to generate a Pareto improvement over laissez-faire then trade is only restricted for a short amount of time. If additional sellers can arrive later, the optimal policy entails asset purchases and price controls. Subsidies can greatly enhance welfare but can be detrimental if provided with delay. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.