Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.021
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 77-102
• 关键词: Incomplete information; Single-good auctions; First-order beliefs; Conservative beliefs

摘要

We study mechanism design in non-Bayesian settings of incomplete information, when the designer has no information about the players, and the players have arbitrary, heterogeneous, first-order, and possibilistic beliefs about their opponents' payoff types. Using such beliefs, in auctions of a single good, we define a revenue benchmark at least as high as the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much higher; prove that it is not meaningfully achievable via traditional notions of implementation; and prove that it is achievable via a notion of implementation based only on mutual belief of rationality. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.