On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Clippel, Geoffroy
• 署名单位: Brown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.017
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 624-647
• 关键词: Bargaining; Welfarism; nash; Kalai Smorodinsky; non-expected utility

摘要

Nash's characterization of his famous bargaining solution has long faced the objection of being welfarist: a bargaining situation is captured by a utility possibility set and a utility vector prevailing in case of disagreement, with no further information regarding the underlying economic environment. The present paper shows that a straightforward adaptation of Nash's axioms in a natural economic environment with lotteries does characterize his solution. A similar result holds for Kalai and Smorodinsky's [8] characterization of their solution if and only if the domain contains multiple goods. The non-welfarist characterization of the Nash solution extends to a larger class of preferences that accommodate some forms of non-expected utility. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.