Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bogomolnaia, Anna
• 署名单位: University of Glasgow
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.008
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 308-318
• 关键词: Random assignment; Serial rule; Leximin

摘要

We provide a new, welfarist, interpretation of the well-known Serial rule in the random assignment problem, strikingly different from previous attempts to define or axiomatically characterize this rule. For each agent i we define t(i)(k) to be the total share of objects from her first k indifference classes this agent i gets. Serial assignment is shown to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the vector of all such shares (t(i)(k)). This result is very general; it applies to non-strict preferences, and/or non-integer quantities of objects, as well. In addition, we characterize Serial rule as the unique one sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, and strategy-proof on the lexicographic preferences extension to lotteries. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.