Exclusive dealing and common agency in international markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Raff, H; Schmitt, N
• 署名单位: University of Kiel; Simon Fraser University; University of Geneva
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.005
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 485-503
• 关键词: International trade; Exclusive dealing; common agency; vertical restraints; COMPETITION POLICY

摘要

This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high, domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised be prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.