Do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Crowley, MA
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.007
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 469-484
• 关键词: trade theory; Trade policy; technology adoption; Antidumping; safeguard measures

摘要

This paper examines how the country-breadth of tariff protection can affect the technology adoption decisions of both domestic import-competing and foreign exporting firms. The contribution of the analysis is to show how firm-level technology adoption changes under tariffs of different country-breadth. I show that a country-specific tariff like an antidumping duty induces both domestic import-competing firms and foreign exporting firms to adopt a new technology earlier than they would under free trade. In contrast, a broadly-applied tariff like a safeguard can accelerate technology adoption by a domestic import-competing firm, but will slow-down technology adoption by foreign exporting firms. Because safeguard tariffs can delay the foreign firm's adoption of new technology, the worldwide welfare costs associated with using them may be larger than is generally believed. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.