Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Wright, MLJ
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.05.007
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 120-149
• 关键词: capital flows; default; borrowing constraints; capital controls; capital subsidies

摘要

What has been the effect of the shift in emerging market capital flows toward private sector borrowers? Are emerging market capital flows more efficient? If not, can controls on capital flows improve welfare? This paper shows that the answers depend on the form of default risk. When private loans are enforceable, but there is the risk that the government will default on behalf of all residents, private lending is inefficient and capital controls are potentially Pareto-improving. However, when private agents may individually default, capital flow subsidies are potentially Pareto-improving. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.