Subsidizing rent-seeking: Antidumping protection and the Byrd Amendment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Reynolds, Kara M.
• 署名单位: American University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.09.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 490-502
• 关键词: Antidumping; Byrd Amendment; rent-seeking; Free riding; trade protection

摘要

This paper argues that a recent U.S. law, which distributes the tariff revenue resulting from successful antidumping petitions to firms that supported the petitions, increases the amount of antidumping protection requested by U.S. firms in two ways. First, by increasing the total benefits accruing to industries filing successful petitions, the law subsidizes rent-seeking. Second, by awarding these subsidies only to those firms that actively support the petition, it mitigates the free rider problem traditionally associated with collective actions. Empirical results provide strong evidence that industries have filed more antidumping petitions under the new law. Moreover, the average proportion of firms in the industry filing these petitions increased under the law, suggesting that the law at least partially alleviates free riding incentives. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.