Should countries control international profit shifting?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peralta, S; Wauthy, X; van Ypersele, T
• 署名单位: Aix-Marseille Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; University Saint-Louis - Bruxelles; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 24-37
• 关键词: taxation of multi-national firms; Profit shifting; Transfer prices; Tax competition; Equilibrium existence

摘要

We present a fiscal competition model with two policy instruments: the level of corporate taxation and the tightness of control of profit shifting by multinational firms (MNF). We show that a country may optimally decide not to monitor the MNF for two reasons. Firstly, this country becomes an attractive location for MNF activity despite a high corporate tax. Secondly, as the profits of the MNF become mobile, the focus of tax competition is shifted. Taxation then influences both an NMF's location and the place where it declares its profits. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.