Catalytic finance: When does it work?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morris, Stephen; Shin, Hyun Song
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.014
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 161-177
• 关键词: catalytic finance; IMF; debtor adjustment; moral hazard; Sovereign debt

摘要

In a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.