Traders, cops and robbers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, James E.; Bandiera, Oriana
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.07.009
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 197-215
• 关键词: predation; ENFORCEMENT; Mafias; Trade costs; illegal trade

摘要

We propose a simple model of trade outside the law preyed on by robbers and possibly protected by private cops. We establish the conditions for trade collapse, secure trade and insecure trade. Endogenous predation and enforcement can explain both puzzling failures of commonly observed state policies against illegal trade and puzzlingly large trade responses to liberalization in licit goods. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.