Costly revenue-raising and the case for favoring import-competing industries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matschke, Xenia
• 署名单位: University of Connecticut
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.05.007
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 143-157
• 关键词: Protection for sale; TARIFFS; Trade policy; costly taxation; political economy

摘要

A standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we should expect export-oriented industries to attract more assistance than import-competing industries. In reality, however, trade policy is heavily biased toward supporting import industries. This paper shows how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation makes trade subsidies less desirable and trade taxes more desirable in a standard protection for sale framework. The model is then estimated and its predictions tested using U.S. tariff data. An empirical estimate of the costliness of revenue-raising is also obtained. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.