Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Athanasiou, Efthymios; Valletta, Giacomo
• 署名单位: New Economic School; Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105355
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Undominated mechanisms; Binary public decisions; strategy-proofness; Decision efficiency; Budget-balance

摘要

We address the problem of choosing between two public alternatives under the assumption that prefer-ences are quasi-linear. We characterize the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and feasible mechanisms that are undominated, that exhibit a minimal degree of neutrality towards the two alternatives and that do not al-low for positive monetary transfers to agents whose preferred alternative is selected. The Pivotal mechanism is the only decision-efficient member of the class. A family of voting mechanisms which do not perform monetary transfers are the only budget-balanced members of the class. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.