Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conconi, Paola; Facchini, Giovanni; Zanardi, Maurizio
• 署名单位: Universite Libre de Bruxelles; University of Nottingham; University of Milan; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Lancaster University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.06.006
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 102-118
• 关键词: Term length; Election proximity; Roll-call votes; trade liberalization

摘要

This paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. We focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the U.S. Congress, in which House and Senate members serve respectively two- and six-year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years. We show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than House representatives. However, this result does not hold for the last generation of senators, who face elections at the same time as House members, suggesting that inter-cameral differences are driven by term length. Considering senators alone, we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two. This result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills. The protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.