Signaling covertly acquired information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ekmekci, Mehmet; Kos, Nenad
• 署名单位: Boston College; Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105746
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Signaling; information acquisition; refinements; NWBR

摘要

We study the interplay between information acquisition and signaling. A sender decides whether to learn his type at a cost prior to taking a signaling action. A receiver observes the signaling action and responds. We characterize equilibria and apply a version of never a weak best response refinement in the environment where the information acquisition is observable as well as in the environment where it is covert. Covert information acquisition always leads to information acquisition when information is cheap. Observable information acquisition, on the other hand, does not necessarily. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.