The epistemic spirit of divinity
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Catonini, Emiliano
署名单位：
Bocconi University; New York University; NYU Shanghai
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2024.105903
发表日期：
2024
关键词：
摘要：
We study strategic reasoning in a signaling game where players initially have common belief in an outcome distribution and in the event that the sender's beliefs are independent of her type. We characterize the behavioral implications of these epistemic hypotheses by means of a rationalizability procedure with belief restrictions. Our solution concept is related to, but weaker than Divine Equilibrium (Banks and Sobel, 1987). First, we do not obtain a sequential equilibrium, but just a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with heterogeneous off-path beliefs (Fudenberg and He, 2018). Second, when we model how the receiver may rationalize a particular deviation, we take into account that some types could have preferred a different deviation, and we show this is natural and relevant via an economic example.