Unilateral stability in matching problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Richter, Michael; Rubinstein, Ariel
• 署名单位: City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Tel Aviv University; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Matching problems; Pairwise stability; Unilateral stability

摘要

The canonical solution concept used in matching problems is pairwise stability, whose premise is that harmony is disrupted by any two agents intentionally leaving their partners to be with each other. We instead focus on scenarios in which harmony is disrupted merely by a single agent unilaterally initiating contact with a member of a different pair, whether or not his approach is reciprocated. A variety of solution concepts are proposed in which taboos, status, or power systematically limit such initiatives in order to achieve harmony.