Does standardized information in online markets disproportionately benefit job applicants from less developed countries?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agrawal, Ajay; Lacetera, Nicola; Lyons, Elizabeth
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.08.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1-12
• 关键词: Digital markets; Trade in services; Information standardization

摘要

We examine trade in services between employers from developed countries (DCs) and workers from less developed countries (LDCs) on an online platform for contract labor. We report evidence that 1) DC employers are less likely to hire LDC compared to DC workers even after controlling for a wide range of observables, 2) workers with standardized and verified work history information are more likely to be hired, and 3) information on verified work history disproportionately benefits LDC contractors. The LDC premium also applies to additional outcomes including wage bids, obtaining an interview, and being shortlisted. In addition, the evidence suggests that informational limits to trade may be addressed through a variety of market design approaches; for instance, an online monitoring tool substitutes for verified work history information. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.