Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet; Renou, Ludovic
• 署名单位: University of London; Queen Mary University London; Boston College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105934
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; information design; COMMITMENT; cheap talk; Multiple experts

摘要

We study a cheap-talk game where two experts offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that the decision-maker's ability to cross-verify the experts' advice acts as a commitment device for the experts. We prove the existence of an equilibrium, where an expert's equilibrium payoff is equal to what he would obtain if he could commit to truthfully revealing his information.