The dynamics of sovereign debt crises and bailouts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roch, Francisco; Uhlig, Harald
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.05.002
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1-13
• 关键词: default; Bailouts; Self-fulfilling crises; endogenous borrowing constraints; long-term debt; OMT; Eurozone debt crisis

摘要

Motivated by the recent European debt crisis, this paper investigates the scope for a bailout guarantee in a sovereign debt crisis. Defaults may arise from negative income shocks, government impatience or a sunspot-coordinated buyers strike. We introduce a bailout agency, and characterize the strategy with the minimal actuarially fair intervention which guarantees the no-buyers-strike fundamental equilibrium, relying on the market for residual financing. The intervention makes it cheaper for governments to borrow, inducing them borrow more, leaving default probabilities possibly rather unchanged. The maximal backstop will be pulled precisely when fundamentals worsen. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.