The global minimum tax raises more revenues than you think, or much less

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Janeba, Eckhard; Schjelderup, Guttorm
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103837
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Global minimum tax; Tax competition; OECD BEPS; Pillar II

摘要

The OECD's global minimum tax (GMT) of 15% on what is deemed excess profit of multina-tionals aims to reduce profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. . We study the revenue effects of the GMT by focusing on strategic tax setting effects. The direct effect from less profit shifting increases revenues in high-tax countries. A secondary effect, however, is that the value of attracting foreign investments increases, which intensifies tax competition. We show that when governments compete via lump sum subsidies, the revenue gains from less profit shifting are exactly offset by higher subsidies. When competition is by tax rates, revenues may increase, however.