Standing in international investment and trade disputes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ossa, Ralph; Staiger, Robert W.; Sykes, Alan O.
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103791
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Investor -state dispute settlement; State -to -state dispute settlement; Trade agreements; Bilateral investment agreements

摘要

International investment agreements employ dispute settlement procedures that differ markedly from their counterparts in trade agreements. A prominent and controversial differ-ence arises with respect to the issue of standing: Who has the right to complain to adjudica-tors about a violation of the agreement? While trade agreements limit standing to the member governments (state-to-state dispute settlement), investment agreements routinely extend standing to private investors as well (investor-state dispute settlement). We develop parallel models of trade and investment agreements and employ them to study this difference. We find that the difference in standing between trade and investment agreements can be understood as deriving from the fundamentally different problems that these agreements are designed to solve. Our analysis also identifies some important qualifications to the case for including investor-state dispute settlement provisions in investment agreements, thereby offer-ing a potential explanation for the strong political controversy associated with these provisions. & COPY; 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).