A theory of economic sanctions as terms-of-trade manipulation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Becko, John Sturm
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103898
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: International trade sanctions; Trade policy; Terms-of-trade manipulation

摘要

How can a country design economic sanctions to maximize their economic cost to the sanctioned country at the lowest cost to the sanctioner? I consider this problem from the perspective of international trade and draw a close connection between trade restrictions as economic sanctions and trade restrictions as terms -of -trade manipulation. This connection has useful implications for the design of trade taxes as sanctions: Small sanctions increase welfare in the sanctioning country. Sanctions target the same goods as terms -of -trade manipulation. Sanctions ignore elasticities of demand and supply in the sanctioning country.