Institutional specialization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guimaraes, Bernardo; Sheedy, Kevin D.
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1996
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103924
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Rule of law; Power sharing; international trade; Extractive institutions; resource curse; political economy

摘要

This paper presents a theory of institutional specialization in which some countries uphold the rule of law while others choose extractive institutions, even when countries are ex -ante identical. The driving force of specialization is that for incumbents in each country, the first steps to the rule of law have the greatest cost. Good institutions require sharing power and rents, but in places where power is already shared broadly, each power base or branch of government underpinning institutions is individually less important and thus receives lower rents. Countries with diametrically opposed institutions have a symbiotic relationship in the world equilibrium. The transition from sail to steam -powered vessels in 19th -century trade provides suggestive evidence supporting the theory.