STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL-POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL-TRADE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BARRETT, S
署名单位：
University of London; University College London
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90039-6
发表日期：
1994
页码：
325-338
关键词：
摘要：
This paper demonstrates that governments may have incentives to impose weak environmental standards on industries that compete for business in imperfectly competitive international markets, where 'weak' means that the marginal cost of abatement is less than the marginal damage from pollution. However, such an intervention is not as efficient as an export or R&D subsidy in improving competitiveness, and depending on the form of competition and market structure, it may instead be optimal for governments to impose strong environmental standards, where 'strong' means that the marginal cost of abatement exceeds the marginal environmental damage.
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