LEARNING THE PREFERENCES OF GOVERNMENTS AND VOTERS FROM PROPOSED SPENDING AND AGGREGATED VOTES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
ROTHSTEIN, P
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90041-8
发表日期：
1994
页码：
361-389
关键词：
摘要：
Remarkably little is known about how to analyze the proposals and voting results from spending referenda when the votes are aggregated by jurisdiction and the proposals are different across jurisdictions. This paper presents a framework in which we can derive the voting equation, comparative statics, and links between reduced form and structural parameters that are implied by different models of the proposal-maker. It is then possible to use interjurisdictional proposal and voting information to test hypotheses about the proposal-maker and the voters. Our empirical work finds support for a modified budget-maximization model over simpler maximization models and various non-maximization models.
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