THE 2ND THEOREM OF THE 2ND BEST
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
HOFF, K
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90061-2
发表日期：
1994
页码：
223-242
关键词：
摘要：
This paper interprets many results from the literature on incentive compatibility and cost-benefit analysis as illustrations of a second theorem of the second best. The theorem states that if there exists any restriction on transactions required for first-best efficiency, then there is no presumption that a social welfare maximum entails equal marginal social utilities of income across individuals. One reason is that incentive constraints shift with redistributions of wealth, so that redistributions have an instrumental role in relaxing constraints that make the economy second best. Two examples relate such wealth effects to countervailing incentives and hostage-taking.
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