INFORMATION EXPROPRIATION AND MORAL HAZARD IN OPTIMAL 2ND-SOURCE AUCTIONS
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
STOLE, LA
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90046-9
发表日期：
1994
页码：
463-484
关键词：
摘要：
Government mandated technology transfers from the developer of a product to a second source offer a potential gain of reduced information rents and procurement costs. To provide appropriate incentives, technology must sometimes be transferred even when the second source is less efficient than the first. Additionally, when developer moral hazard exists with respect to investments in cost-reducing technology, the optimal auction will make the developer's success in the auction more sensitive to the developing firm's announced costs.
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