PROPRIETARY PUBLIC-FINANCE AND ECONOMIC WELFARE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
GROSSMAN, HI; NOH, SJ
署名单位：
Hallym University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90020-5
发表日期：
1994
页码：
187-204
关键词：
摘要：
We develop a positive theory of public finance in which the objective of tax and spending policy is to extract rents for the incumbent ruler. The analysis shows how dependence of the incumbent ruler's survival probability on his tax and spending policy can lower the equilibrium tax rate and increase the equilibrium amount of spending on productive public services, but only until the minimum credible tax rate, which depends on the ruler's endogenous survival probability, becomes a binding constraint. The central result of the analysis is that, if a relatively benevolent tax and spending policy is both necessary and sufficient for a high survival probability, then the ruler's equilibrium policy is relatively benevolent.
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