COMPETITION IN REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES WHEN PLANT LOCATIONS ARE ENDOGENOUS

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: MARKUSEN, JR; MOREY, ER; OLEWILER, N
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Simon Fraser University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01419-O
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 55-77
• 关键词: environmental policy; Tax competition; PLANT LOCATION

摘要

A two-region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level. Production of the good causes local pollution. The firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions, serve both regions from a single plant or shut down. If the disutility of pollution is high enough, the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes (standards) until the polluting firm is driven from the market. Alternatively, if the disutility from pollution is not as great, the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other's pollution tax rates.