WHY VOTERS VOTE FOR INCUMBENTS BUT AGAINST INCUMBENCY - A RATIONAL CHOICE EXPLANATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: FRIEDMAN, D; WITTMAN, D
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01436-R
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 67-83
• 关键词: TERM LIMITS; POLITICAL REDISTRIBUTION; RATIONAL VOTER

摘要

In recent elections, voters supported initiatives to limit the number of terms that their representatives may serve, yet at the same time, overwhelmingly re-elected their incumbents. We provide a theoretical explanation for this and other puzzles associated with voting on term limitations. The pattern of voting on term limits can be explained by the desire to redistribute power from one party to another, from one branch of government to another, and from districts with long-term incumbents to districts whose representatives have served only for a short time span. We test these hypotheses by looking at voting patters on California Proposition 140 and the vote on the 22nd Amendment with generally positive results.