OPTIMAL REGULATION OF MNES AND GOVERNMENT REVENUES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DASGUPTA, S; SENGUPTA, K
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Riverside
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01474-3
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 215-234
• 关键词: MULTINATIONALS; regulation; asymmetric information; OWNERSHIP; transfer pricing

摘要

The paper analyses the optimal regulation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) by a host government interested in maximizing tax revenues, when the MNE has private information about its benefits of controlling the enterprise. It is shown that the optimal mechanism involves restricting the MNE's ownership of the enterprise, and setting a ceiling on the transfer price of an input that the MNE provides that is above the known production cost of the input. For low realizations of the benefits of control, the MNE transfers control to a domestic partner, while for high realizations, it retains control.