MISPERCEIVED JOB HAZARDS AND WELFARE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: FRASER, CD
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(93)01414-6
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 97-123
• 关键词: HAZARDS; misperceptions; welfare; Externality; equilibrium

摘要

Bayesian workers produce 'chemicals' hazardously in one sector of a two-sector economy having one safe sector. Adopting an expected ex post welfare perspective, we show workers' misperceptions of hazards entail a classic externality. We characterise chemicals' competitive, monopoly and socially efficient outputs, assuming workers receive identical wage-accident compensation contracts under each, the value of information which induces workers to place greater stress on firms' safety records or sharpens their priors, and extend the standard monopoly welfare loss index for sufficient conditions for monopoly to be preferred to competition in chemicals and for size-ranking monopoly and efficient chemical outputs.